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1 Introduction
Over the past decades, international R&D collaboration between rms has grown fast. For
instance, by the late 1990s, international R&D partnerships accounted for about one half
of the newly established R&D partnerships (Hagedoorn, 2002).1 At the same time, the
number of free trade agreements (FTAs) between countries rose substantially.2 Despite
its acknowledged importance, economists have done comparatively little work relating the
increase in the number of FTAs to the spread of international R&D collaborations. It
is quite possible though that international R&D collaboration is a¤ected by the trade
relationships among countries where the rms are located. Indeed, the removal of trade
barriers allows rms to access new markets and might induce them to do more R&D, either
independently or with others, responding to a greater demand for their products. This
article develops a model to explore how FTAs between countries as well as international
R&D networks between rms emerge endogenously.
The literature on network formation devotes considerable attention to understanding
how an R&D network (e.g. Goyal and Moraga-González, 2001; Zikos, 2010; Zu et al., 2011;
Kesavayuth et al., 2014) or an FTA network (e.g. Goyal and Joshi, 2006; Furusawa and
Konishi, 2007) emerges in equilibrium. Rather than viewing the two network formation
decisions as separate, this article treats both as endogenous and considers their possible
interactions, potentially providing new insights into the impact of FTAs on international
R&D networks and vice versa.
We envisage a model with three ex-ante identical rms located in three ex-ante symmet-
ric countries. The rm in each country can sell both to the domestic and foreign markets.
1There are di¤erent types of R&D collaboration in the literature, the most common ones being Research
Joint Ventures (RJVs) and R&D networks. As documented by Caloghirou et al. (2003), non-equity types
of alliances such as R&D networks accounted for about 85% of the total number of R&D collaborations
by the mid-1990s. It has been argued that such popularity for R&D networks is partly attributed to
the fact that they are often easier to establish, administer and dissolve relative to RJVs, all of which are
important factors in a rapidly changing business environment (Narula and Hagedoorn, 1999). In this article
we specically focus on R&D networks; for studies on RJVs, though in a di¤erent context, the reader is
directed to the articles by dAspremont and Jacquemin (1988), Kamien et al. (1992), Poyago-Theotoky
(1995, 1999), Gil-Molto et al. (2005), Falvey et al. (2013) and Manasakis et al. (2014), among others.
2For more information on FTAs see Regional Trade Agreementsat http://www.wto.org.
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The government of each country can initiate bilateral FTAs to abolish the import tari¤s of
partners, but will impose trade tari¤s on countries with whom it has no FTA. The set of
FTAs between countries makes up an FTA network. And rms decide whether (and with
whom) to form R&D collaborations; these collaborations make up an R&D network. As a
result, there are two layers of networks in our model: the rst is an FTA network, and the
second is an R&D network.
Our rst result concerns the inuence of FTAs on international R&D networks. We
nd that FTAs can promote international R&D collaboration between rms. Intuitively,
an R&D collaboration between two rms is more benecial to them if the corresponding
countries sign a bilateral FTA. Note that when rms form an R&D link, they subsequently
compete in the product market. As it turns out, the negative e¤ect of product-market
competition on the domestic rms prots is outweighed by the gains from greater access to
the foreign market. This nding is consistent with the stylized facts: FTAs have grown fast
since the early 1990s, while international R&D collaboration has become a more prevalent
phenomenon over the same period.
Our next result investigates the stability properties of FTA and international R&D
networks. Here we nd that the complete FTA network (where each country has FTAs
with all others) along with the complete R&D network (where each rm collaborates in
R&D with all others) is the unique double-layer pairwise stable network. In terms of social
welfare, private incentives to form FTAs are adequate from a global welfare viewpoint.
However, this result does not hold for rmsincentives to establish R&D networks; as it
turns out, rms have stronger incentives to engage in R&D collaboration than is socially
desirable.
These ndings contribute to three strands of research. First, they contribute to the
literature on R&D networks (e.g. Goyal and Moraga-González, 2001; Deroian and Gannon,
2006; Zikos, 2010; Zirulia, 2012; Kesavayuth et al., 2014). We develop this literature by
casting the analysis within an open economy where rms compete in di¤erent markets.
Each rm decides how much to produce in the domestic market and how much to export
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to the foreign markets. The ability of rms to have access both to the domestic and foreign
markets allows us to consider their behavior in di¤erent market environments and also
incorporate trade tari¤s into the model. Our model therefore allows for an investigation of
the impact of FTAs on international R&D collaborations and vice versa, a topic that has
not been explored as yet in the literature.
Second, our article contributes to the literature on FTA networks (e.g. Goyal and Joshi,
2006; Furusawa and Konishi, 2007), which examines the formation of FTAs as a network
formation game.3 We broaden this focus by considering the e¤ects of the formation of
FTAs on international R&D networks. Accordingly we develop a new model of double-
layer networks where any architecture of FTAs is determined endogenously in the rst
network layer, and the structure of an R&D network emerges in the second network layer.
Third, our article contributes to the literature on international trade (e.g. Kennan and
Riezman, 1990; Bond and Syropoulos, 1996; Bond et al., 2004), which is concerned with
the e¤ects of FTAs on social welfare, as well as the incentives of FTA partners to impose
tari¤s on third countries. The trading architectures in previous studies are assumed to be
xed. Thus the present article attempts to develop this literature by allowing trading
architectures (i.e. FTA networks) to emerge endogenously through strategic interactions
between countries.
Closest in spirit to our approach is the article by Zu et al. (2011) examining the
interplay between market sharing agreements and R&D collaborations among three rms
located in three di¤erent countries. There are, however, two important di¤erences between
Zu et al. (2011) and our article. First, Zu et al. (2011) consider market sharing agreements
rather than FTAs. However, in reality, countries often discuss a range of FTAs, and the
absence of an FTA is usually not the same as the prohibition of sales. The present article
investigates the inuence of FTAs on international R&D networks, where an FTA refers
3Goyal and Joshi (2006) study a model of n ex-ante identical rms located in n symmetric countries. The
papers main nding is that bilateralism leads to global free trade. Another nding is that if two countries
sign a bilateral FTA, they lower their trade tari¤s imposed on third countries. Furusawa and Konishi
(2007) investigate a model with many countries trading a continuum of di¤erentiated products. They
show that the main nding of Goyal and Joshi (2006) is robust and holds for a setting with di¤erentiated
products and price competition.
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to the reduction of trade tari¤s between two countries to zero, an approach reecting the
real world more closely.
Moreover, in our article, trade tari¤s are endogenous variables. Zu et al. (2011) do
not consider trade tari¤s. But as Goyal and Joshi (2006) found, the outcomes of a model
where trade tari¤s are endogenous is consistent with the spirit of The General Agreement
on Tari¤s and Trade (GATT) that an increase in tari¤s against third parties is not the
result of regional trade agreements. It is an essential motivation for the present article to
model trade tari¤s as endogenous, aiming to formalize the aforementioned body of evidence.
In doing so, we aim to encourage a broader investigation of FTAs and R&D networks, one
that takes both decisions as endogenous and considers their possible interactions.
2 The model
2.1 Sequence of moves
We envisage a setting with three ex-ante identical rms located in three ex-ante symmetric
countries. In each country there is one rm producing a homogenous good.4 Given that
rm i is located in country i, let N = f1; 2; 3g be the set of rms (or countries). The
interaction between rms and countries is governed by a ve stage game. In stage one,
the governments choose simultaneously their bilateral FTAs to abolish the import tari¤s
of partners. In stage two, the rms choose simultaneously their R&D collaborations in
order to share knowledge emanating from cost-reducing R&D investments. In stage three,
the governments decide simultaneously the level of trade tari¤s they will impose on the
countries with whom they have no FTA. In stage four, the rms choose simultaneously their
individual R&D e¤orts. And in the last stage, each rm decides how much to produce in
the domestic market as well as how much to export to the foreign markets.
The timing of moves reects that some decisions are longer-term than others. For
instance, the timing of moves makes the model an appropriate description of a situation
4All results hold if we assume that there is a set of three horizontally di¤erentiated products.
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in which FTAs are long-run decisions, while R&D collaborations can be adjusted on a
shorter-term basis. In fact, using a survey with data from 255 Japanese small and medium
manufacturers, Okamuro (2004) found that R&D collaborations have an average duration
of 4.5 years. By contrast, FTAs are often more costly to establish and dissolve than R&D
agreements. Thus, like in the case of the European Union, FTAs are likely to last relatively
longer.
The previous multi-stage game is solved backwards from stage ve to stage three. Then
we turn to the second stage, the R&D network formation stage, which is solved by applying
the well-established equilibrium notion of pairwise stability (Jackson and Wolinsky, 1996)
explained in the sequel. The nal step is to solve stage one, the FTA network formation
stage, by using again the notion of pairwise stability, similarly to stage two.
2.2 Networks of R&D collaboration and FTAs
Let gl denote the networks of R&D collaborations given that l = RD, and the networks of
FTAs given that l = T ; l 2 fT;RDg. An R&D (or FTA) link between the rm (or country)
i and the rm (or country) j under the network gl is represented by ij 2 gl: Formally, an
R&D (or FTA) network is a collection of bilateral links between rms (or countries). Denote
as gl+ij the network obtained when rms (countries) i and j add a new link between them
to the existing network gl. Denote as gl   ij the network obtained when rms (countries)
i or j sever the link between them in the existing network gl. Further, dene Ni(g) as the
set of rms directly connected to rm i under a network gl. Let GRD (GT ) be the set of
all possible R&D (FTA) networks. For any given pair of network structures (gT ; gRD), the
rst part (gT ) species the type of the FTA network, and the second part (gRD) the R&D
collaboration network.
2.3 R&D e¤ort levels and spillovers
Firms invest in R&D to reduce their marginal costs. Denote rm is R&D e¤ort as ei.
The cost of exerting R&D e¤ort is given by Z(ei) = e2i , where  > 0 captures the
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e¢ ciency of the R&D technology (dAspremont and Jacquemin, 1988). Following Goyal
and Moraga-González (2001), we model public spillovers. That is, if two rms have no
direct R&D collaboration, they can enjoy publicspillovers from each other denoted by
 2 [0; 1). But if two rms have a collaborative link, they can enjoy full privatespillovers,
i.e.  = 1. Thus the e¤ective R&D e¤ort of rm i representing the overall reduction in
rm is marginal cost due to R&D is given by:
Ei = ei +
X
k2Ni(g)
ek + 
X
l =2Ni(g)
el. (1)
2.4 Marginal costs
Denote as qji the quantity sold by rm i in country j. The total quantity sold by rm i
in all markets is therefore qi = qii +
P
j 6=i
qji . The marginal cost of rm i under the pair of
network structures (gT ; gRD), when producing the quantity qii in the domestic market and
exporting the quantity
P
j 6=i
qji , is given by ci = c  Ei, with c > 0.
2.5 Payo¤s
The inverse demand function in country i is given by Pi(Qi) = a   Qi, where Qi is the
total demand in country i, Qi =
3P
j=1
qij, and 0  Qi < a. To ensure that all equilibrium
variables are non-negative, we assume that a > c. By calculation, note that when  > 5 all
equilibrium variables are non-negative for all  2 (0; 1], and prot functions are concave.
For simplicity we set  = 5.
The prot of rm i is dened as the di¤erence between revenues and costs (i.e. costs
from production, trade tari¤s and R&D activities):
i = (a Qi)qii +
X
j 6=i
(a Qj)qji   ciqi  
X
j 6=i
tjiq
j
i   e2i , (2)
where tji denotes the trade tari¤ that country j imposes on each unit of good imported
from country i, with tji = t
i
j = 0 if there is an FTA between countries i and j.
7
Each country chooses trade tari¤s to maximize its social welfare dened as the sum
of consumer surplus (CS), producer surplus (PS) and tari¤ revenues (TR). Thus social
welfare in country i under the pair of network structures (gT ; gRD) is given by:
Wi =
Q2i
2|{z}
CS
+ i|{z}
PS
+
X
j 6=i
tij q
i
j| {z }
TR
. (3)
Without loss of generality, we label FTA network the rst layer of networkand R&D
network the second layer of network, given that an R&D network is formed after an FTA
network.
2.6 Stability and e¢ ciency
We adapt the denition of pairwise stability introduced by Jackson and Wolinsky (1996)
to examine the stability properties of FTA networks and international R&D networks.
Following Jackson and Wolinsky (1996), we say that a network is pairwise stable if no
agent (rm or country) has an incentive to delete unilaterally one of its links, and no pair
of agents want to form a new link (with one beneting strictly and the other at least
weakly).
Building on the concept of pairwise stability, we further consider a double layer network
structure, where FTA networks are formed in the rst layer and international R&D net-
works in the second layer. To examine the stability of this structure, we adapt the concept
of double-layer pairwise stabilityproposed by Zu et al. (2011):
Denition 1 Let gRD(gT ) be one of the pairwise stable R&D collaboration networks under
a given FTA network gT . The double layer network (gT ; gRD) is double-layer pairwise stable
if:
(i) for all ij 2 gT , Wi(gT ; gRD(gT )) > Wi(gT   ij; gRD(gT   ij))
and Wj(gT ; gRD(gT )) > Wj(gT   ij; gRD(gT   ij)) , and
(ii) for all ij =2 gT , if Wi(gT ; gRD(gT )) < Wi(gT + ij; gRD(gT + ij)), then
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Wi(g
T ; gRD(gT )) > Wi(g
T + ij; gRD(gT + ij)).
This denition says that the pair of network structures (gT ; gRD) is double-layer pairwise
stable if both layers of networks are pairwise stable. We also assess the e¢ ciency properties
of the double-layer networks using global welfare. We say that a network (gT ; gRD) 2
(GT ; GRD) is e¢ cient if it is not dominated in terms of global welfare by any other network;
that is, if W (gT ; gRD) > W (gT 0; gRD0) for all (gT 0; gRD0) 2 (GT ; GRD), where W (gT ; gRD) =
3P
i=1
Wi(g
T ; gRD).
2.7 Notation for equilibrium outcomes
For a hypothetical choice variable zyx and a pair of network structures (g
T ; gRD), let
zyx(g
T ; gRD) denote a variable at the subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium. The lower sub-
script x denotes the position of a country in the FTA network, while the superscript y
denotes the position of a rm in the R&D network, with fx; yg 2 fE;L; I;H; S; Cg. Ac-
cordingly, the following cases are possible regarding the various positions that a country
(or rm) can occupy in a given network:
x(or y) = E stands for the country (or rm) in the empty FTA (or R&D) network
x(or y) = L stands for the linked country (or rm) in the partial FTA (or R&D) network
x(or y) = I stands for the isolated country (or rm) in the partial FTA (or R&D) network
x(or y) = S stands for the spoke country (or rm) in the star FTA (or R&D) network
x(or y) = H stands for the hub country (or rm) in the star FTA (or R&D) network
x(or y) = C stands for the country (or rm) in the complete FTA (or R&D) network.
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3 Endogenous double-layer networks
3.1 Equilibrium in the second network layer
In this section we use the denition of pairwise stability to investigate the stability prop-
erties of R&D networks in the second network layer, given di¤erent trading regimes in
the rst network layer. Consider rst the empty FTA network, gTe , where no country has
an FTA. Figure 1 illustrates all possible R&D network structures under the empty FTA
network.
1
2 3
1
2 3
1
2 3
1
2 3
(gTe ; g
RD
e ) (g
T
e ; g
RD
p ) (g
T
e ; g
RD
s ) (g
T
e ; g
RD
c )
Figure 1: R&D networks structures under the empty FTA network
The following Lemma summarizes our ndings.5
Lemma 1 Under the empty FTA network, the pairwise stable R&D networks are:
(i) (gTe ; g
RD
e ) for all  2 [4; 1)
(ii) (gTe ; g
RD
p ) for all  2 [0; 1) and  2 (3; 4]
(iii) (gTe ; g
RD
s ) for all  2 [2; 3]
(iv) (gTe ; g
RD
c ) for all  2 [0; 2] and  2 [3; 1)
where 0 < 1 < 2 < 3 < 4 < 1:
Lemma 1 shows that di¤erent R&D networks can be stable as spillovers vary. More
specically, the empty R&D network is pairwise stable if spillovers are su¢ ciently high.
The rationale follows from the fact that (public) spillovers can be seen as a substitute for
collaborative links, because they can occur between rms without an R&D link between
5By calculation we obtain 1  0:04 and 3  0:94 as the solutions to the equation LE(gTe ; gRDp ) =
HE (g
T
e ; g
RD
s ); 2  0:92 as the solution to the equation CE(gTe ; gRDc ) = SE(gTe ; gRDs ); and 4  0:96 as
the solution to the equation EE(g
T
e ; g
RD
e ) = 
L
E(g
T
e ; g
RD
p ). Additional information is available from the
authors on request.
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them (Goyal and Moraga-González, 2001). Thus, as long as spillovers are high, rms have
no incentive to form R&D links, and the empty network emerges in equilibrium.
As (public) spillovers become lower, the increase in knowledge-sharing emanating from
R&D collaboration becomes more pronounced relative to non-collaboration. This in turn
endows rms with incentives to form some links with each other, meaning that denser
networks emerge in equilibrium, as spillovers become lower. As Lemma 1 states, the partial
R&D network is pairwise stable for  2 (3; 4], the star R&D network for  2 [2; 3],
and the complete R&D network for  2 [0; 2]. Besides, the complete R&D network is
stable when spillovers are very high, i.e.  2 [0:94; 1], the reason being that collaborating
in R&D implies a prot gain for the spoke rms in the star network.
Consider next the partial FTA network, gTp , where two countries have a bilateral FTA
and one is isolated. Figure 2 shows that given the partial FTA network in the rst network
layer (denoted by a dashed line), there are six possible R&D networks in the second network
layer (denoted by solid lines).
1
2 3
1
2 3
1
2 3
(gTp ; g
RD
e ) (g
T
p ; g
RD
pL ) (g
T
p ; g
RD
pI )
1
2 3
1
2 3
1
2 3
(gTp ; g
RD
sH ) (g
T
p ; g
RD
sS ) (g
T
p ; g
RD
c )
Figure 2: R&D networks structures under the partial FTA network
The following Lemma summarizes.6
Lemma 2 Under the partial FTA network, the pairwise stable R&D networks are:
6By calculation we obtain 5  0:94 as the solution to the equation SI (gTp ; gRDsH ) = CI (gTp ; gRDc ); and
6  0:96 as the solution to the equation II(gTp ; gRDpL ) = SI (gTp ; gRDsH ). Additional information is available
on request.
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(i) (gTp ; g
RD
pL ) for all  2 (6; 1)
(ii) (gTp ; g
RD
sH ) for all  2 (5; 6]
(iii) (gTp ; g
RD
c ) for all  2 [0; 5] and  2 (6; 1)
where 0 < 5 < 6 < 1:
As Lemma 2 suggests, under the partial FTA network, the empty R&D network is
no longer stable. This is because both rms located in the two linked countries of the
FTA network have an incentive to collaborate with each other. Intuitively, when an FTA
is formed between two countries, the rm in each country enjoys greater access to the
market of the other rm, but also incurs higher competition in its domestic market. It
turns out that the former positive e¤ect dominates the latter negative; thus an FTA softens
competition between rms. In turn, the softer competition encourages R&D collaboration
as rms become less exposed to the competition e¤ect implied by R&D collaboration.
Consequently, only networks containing links between rms emerge in equilibrium under
the partial FTA network, as Lemma 2 states.
We proceed to consider the star FTA network, gTs , where a country (the hub) has two
FTAs, and the other two countries (the spokes) have one FTA each. Figure 3 shows that
given the star FTA network in the rst network layer (denoted by two dashed lines), there
are six possible R&D networks in the second network layer (denoted by solid lines).
1
2 3
1
2 3
1
2 3
(gTs ; g
RD
e ) (g
T
s ; g
RD
pL ) (g
T
s ; g
RD
pI )
1
2 3
1
2 3
1
2 3
(gTs ; g
RD
sH ) (g
T
s ; g
RD
sS ) (g
T
s ; g
RD
c )
Figure 3: R&D networks structures under the star FTA network
The following lemma presents our ndings.
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Lemma 3 Under the star FTA network, the R&D network (gTs ,g
RD
c ) is uniquely pairwise
stable for all  2 [0; 1).
Lemma 3 suggests that, under the star FTA network, the complete R&D network is
uniquely pairwise stable. All other R&D networks are no longer stable because rms in the
partial network have an incentive to deviate to the star and then the complete network. The
partial R&D network is not stable because there is an FTA between the country where
the isolated rm is located and the country where a linked rm is located. Intuitively,
an FTA softens competition between rms, as explained earlier. The softer competition
encourages the linked rms to form R&D links with their isolated counterpart, which in
turn destabilizes the partial R&D network. Likewise, the competition between the hub and
spoke rms under the star R&D network is softer as a result of FTAs, thereby providing
the spoke rms with incentives to form R&D links with each other. By collaborating in
R&D, the spoke rms can also limit the extent of their cost disadvantage relative to the
hub.
Last, consider the complete FTA network, gTc , where each country has an FTA with
all others. Figure 4 shows that given the complete FTA network in the rst network layer
(denoted by dashed lines), there are four possible R&D networks in the second network
layer (denoted by solid lines).
1
2 3
1
2 3
1
2 3
1
2 3
(gTc ; g
RD
e ) (g
T
c ; g
RD
p ) (g
T
c ; g
RD
s ) (g
T
c ; g
RD
c )
Figure 4: R&D networks structures under the complete FTA network
The following lemma summarizes our ndings.
Lemma 4 Under the complete FTA network, the R&D network (gTc ; g
RD
c ) is uniquely
pairwise stable for all  2 [0; 1).
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As mentioned earlier, if two countries sign an FTA, the two rms located in these
countries have a stronger incentive to collaborate in R&D, since the competition e¤ect of
the R&D collaboration is weaker than in the absence of an FTA. By the same logic, each
rm will have an incentive to form R&D links with all others, given the complete FTA
network. Thus, as Lemma 4 reports, the complete R&D network emerges as the unique
pairwise stable network.
Combining the previous lemmas, we can readily state the following result:
Proposition 1 Free trade agreements are benecial to international R&D collaborations.
FTAs expand the interval of spillovers in which the complete R&D network is stable, but
contract the interval of spillovers in which other R&D networks are stable. This indicates an
important link between FTAs and R&D networks that FTAs can promote the formation
of R&D networks, as Proposition 1 states. The present result is consistent with the stylized
facts. Over the past decades, international R&D collaboration between rms has grown
fast while FTAs between countries have become a more prevalent phenomenon.
3.2 Equilibrium in the rst network layer
To investigate the stability properties of FTA networks we turn to the rst layer of network,
given di¤erent international R&D networks in the second network layer. To do this, we
employ again the denition of pairwise stability. As the analysis is very similar to that
presented in the previous section, we proceed to summarize our main ndings as follows:7
Lemma 5 (i) Under the empty R&D network, the pairwise stable FTA networks are:
(gTp ; g
RD
e ) for all  2 [0; 7]; and (gTc ; gRDe ) for all  2 [0; 1)
(ii) Under the partial R&D network, the pairwise stable FTA networks are:
7Similarly to the previous section, we identify critical values of  for which FTA networks are pairwise
stable under a given R&D network. Specically, 7  0:19 is dened as the solution to the equation
WES (g
T
s ; g
RD
e ) = W
E
I (g
T
p ; g
RD
e ); 8  0:67 is the solution to the equation W II (gTp ; gRDpL ) = W IS(gTs ; gRDpL );
and 9  0:13 is the solution to the equation WSI (gTp ; gRDsH ) =WSS (gTs ; gRDsS ).
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(gTp ; g
RD
pL ) for all  2 [0; 8); and (gTc ; gRDp ) for all  2 [0; 1)
(iii) Under the star R&D network, the pairwise stable FTA networks are:
(gTp ; g
RD
sH ) for all  2 [0; 9); and (gTc ; gRDs ) for all  2 [0; 1)
(iv) Under the complete R&D network, the FTA networks (gTc ; g
RD
c ) is uniquely pairwise
stable for all  2 [0; 1)
where 0 < 9 < 7 < 8 < 1:
We elaborate on some aspects of Lemma 5. First, the lemma suggests that the partial
FTA network is pairwise stable if spillovers are su¢ ciently low, given the empty, partial, or
star R&D network. When spillovers are su¢ ciently low, forming an FTA is not particularly
valuable for the isolated country within the partial FTA network. Signing an FTA increases
competition in the domestic market and thus consumer surplus goes up. At the same time,
an FTA leads to a decrease in both tax revenues and producer surplus. It turns out
that the former positive e¤ect of an FTA (on consumer surplus) is not strong enough
to outweigh the latter negative e¤ect (on tax revenues and producer surplus) because
the extent of knowledge-sharing through spillovers which are low cannot boost consumer
surplus su¢ ciently. Thus the partial FTA network emerges in equilibrium, as Lemma
5 reports. By contrast, if spillovers are su¢ ciently high, the domestic market becomes
more competitive. Therefore, the increase in consumer surplus outweighs the concomitant
decrease in tax revenues and producer surplus, in turn providing support for welfare-
enhancing deviations from the partial FTA network.
Second, Lemma 5 suggests that the complete FTA network is uniquely pairwise stable,
given the complete R&D network. In this case, each rm has R&D links with all others,
meaning that all rms are competitive. Consider the partial FTA network: if the isolated
country initiates an FTA, then competition in its (domestic) market will become higher. As
it turns out, the resulting increase in consumer surplus outweighs the decrease in producer
surplus and tax revenues. Consequently, due to the FTA, the isolated countrys welfare
will go up, thereby providing the isolated country with an incentive to form this FTA. By
the same logic, there are welfare-enhancing deviations in the star FTA network leading to
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the complete FTA network in equilibrium, as Lemma 5 reports.
3.3 Equilibrium double-layer networks
We now combine the previous lemmas to see which network structures, both for FTAs and
international R&D networks, emerge endogenously as double-layer pairwise stable. The
following proposition presents our ndings:
Proposition 2 The complete FTA network along with the complete R&D network is the
unique double-layer pairwise stable network for all  2 [0; 1).
From the previous analysis we know that the complete FTA network is always pairwise
stable in the rst network layer, regardless of the R&D network in the second layer (Lemmas
1-4). The complete R&D network is uniquely pairwise stable in the second network layer,
given the complete FTA network (Lemma 5). Each layer of the other double layer structures
might be pairwise stable, but both layers are not pairwise stable for the same values of
spillovers. Therefore, the complete-complete network is uniquely double-layer pairwise
stable, as Proposition 2 states.
Proposition 2 might appear initially surprising when compared with the outcome in a
closed economy. In particular, Goyal and Moraga-González (2001) have shown that the
partial R&D network is pairwise stable when the market environment is very competitive
(i.e. rms compete in a homogeneous-good market), whereas the complete R&D network
is uniquely pairwise stable when rms operate in independent markets. By contrast, we
nd that when markets are very competitive, the complete R&D network is the unique
pairwise stable network.
The intuition behind the di¤erence in the equilibrium R&D networks stems from the
fact that we allow for FTAs among countries. When FTAs are formed, the domestic
market becomes more competitive while the foreign markets become less competitive for
the domestic rm, because the domestic rm can gain access to these markets at zero
trade tari¤s. It turns out that the latter e¤ect outweighs the former, implying that overall
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competition is lower. This in turn gives rise to the complete R&D network even if markets
are very competitive, like in our setting, a result that contrasts sharply with the equilibrium
outcome in a closed economy.
4 E¢ cient double-layer networks
The next step is to see which FTA networks along with which international R&D networks
are e¢ cient. Using global social welfare as our measure of e¢ ciency leads to the following
proposition.8
Proposition 3 The following double-layer networks are globally e¢ cient:
(i) The complete FTA network along with the star R&D network for all  2 [0; 10]
(ii) The complete FTA network along with the partial R&D network for all  2 [10; 11]
(iii) The complete FTA network along with the empty R&D network for all  2 [11; 1)
where 0 < 10 < 11 < 1:
Figure 5 provides a graphical representation of Proposition 3 by illustrating global
social welfare in the di¤erent double-layer network structures, where the rst layer is the
complete FTA network.
8Dene 10  0:27 as the solution to the equation W (gTc ; gRDs ) = W (gTc ; gRDp ); and 11  0:45 as the
solution to the equation W (gTc ; g
RD
p ) =W (g
T
c ; g
RD
e ).
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Figure 5: Global welfare levels of e¢ cient networks
Proposition 3 suggests that the complete FTA network is globally e¢ cient. As explained
earlier, for a given R&D network, an FTA implies a positive e¤ect on the welfare of the
country who initiated the FTA. Specically, consumer surplus increases due to greater
competition in domestic market; also the domestic rms prots from its foreign operations
increase following greater access to the foreign market. However, an FTA implies negative
e¤ects as well: it lowers tax revenues and also tends to reduce the domestic rms prots
due to higher competition in the domestic market. It turns out that the former positive
e¤ects outweigh the latter negative. Thus the complete FTA network emerges as globally
e¢ cient, a result consistent with Goyal and Joshi (2006) and Furusawa and Konishi (2007)
for a setting without R&D networks.
Proposition 3 further suggests that the complete R&D network is not e¢ cient. For
a given FTA network, R&D collaborations tend to increase global welfare, because they
reduce rmscosts and thereby increase rmsquantities and prots. On the other hand,
R&D collaborations are detrimental to global welfare because well-connected rms under-
take very little R&D e¤orts due to increased competition implied by R&D collaboration.
When an R&D network is sparse, the competition e¤ect is relatively weak, and thus, it
is dominated by the positive impact of R&D collaboration on welfare. By contrast, in a
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dense R&D network, the competition e¤ect is more pronounced and thus outweighs the
welfare-enhancing e¤ect of R&D collaboration. This is the reason why the complete R&D
network is not e¢ cient in the present setting.
Taken together, Propositions 2 and 3 show that the complete R&D network is stable
but not e¢ cient. At the same time, the complete FTA network is both stable and e¢ cient.
This in turn suggests that, in pursuit of their private interests, countries may achieve an
outcome that is also socially desirable, while the number of R&D collaborations is likely
to be excessive from a social viewpoint.
5 Conclusion
This article provides some of the rst insights into the endogenous formation of FTAs
between countries and R&D networks between rms. Building a double-layer network
model, we found that FTAs extend the interval of spillovers in which the complete R&D
network is stable, but contract the interval of spillovers in which other R&D networks are
stable. In line with the stylized facts, this result indicates an important link between FTAs
and R&D networks that FTAs can promote the formation of R&D networks.
Another nding of the paper concerns the double-layer network structures that will
emerge endogenously. Here we found that the complete FTA network along with the
complete R&D network is the unique stable network. In terms of social welfare, private
incentives to form bilateral FTAs are adequate from a global welfare viewpoint, but for
R&D networks, there is a conict between private and social incentives.
More generally this research suggests that the joint consideration of FTAs and R&D
networks, rather than viewing them as separate decisions, may be important for under-
standing how these two phenomena occur in equilibrium. This approach allows for an
examination of their possible interaction e¤ects, which had not been studied in the liter-
ature. Although there are no simple policy implications, our nding that the number of
R&D collaborations, but not the number of FTAs, is excessive from a social viewpoint
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calls for more caution regarding the provision of subsidies to R&D collaborations, a central
policy tool over the last decades in the European Union, the United States and Japan. A
similar suggestion was made by Klette et al. (2000) that the provision of R&D subsidies
should be accompanied by a more thorough evaluation of their social returns. Our frame-
work can certainly accommodate further research on this topic. In future work it would
be interesting to explore, for instance, the impact of asymmetries across markets and rms
on the formation of FTAs and R&D networks.
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Appendix
A1. Equilibrium Outcomes
In this section we present the equilibrium outcomes for the di¤erent congurations of
FTA and R&D networks. Note that the second order conditions are always fullled, and
the equilibrium outcomes are non-negative for all values of the spillover parameter.9Let
a1 = a  c > 0. Equilibrium outcomes are as follows:
A1.1 The empty FTA networks
A1.1.1 The empty-empty network (gTe ; g
RD
e )
tji = 30a1(467 + 192   1602 + 1923   484)=2
eEE = 3a1(3  2)(467 + 351   1582 + 843   244)=2
qii = 20a1(934 + 543   3182 + 2763   724)=2
qji = 20a1(934 + 543   3182 + 2763   724)=2
CSEE = 1800(a1)
2(467 + 351   1582 + 843   244)2=(2)2
WEE = 15(a1)
2K2=(2)
2; EE = 15(a1)
2K1=(2)
2
where 1=781+933-474
2+2523-724:
2=42497+23157-13026
2+159123-55684+12965-2886:
K1 = 20282277 + 32399526 + 3390253
2 - 18162243 + 45640804 - 28905605 +
5645766 + 967687 - 1981448 + 691209 - 691210.
K2 = 55176517 + 84852966 - 1520347
2 - 70352643 + 157802404 - 101212805 +
24365766 - 3409927 - 1290248 + 691209 - 691210.
9It turns out that some expressions for the equilibrium outcomes are very lengthy. Although they are
not reported here, they are available from the authors upon request along with relevant plots.
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A1.1.2. The empty-complete network (gTe ; g
RD
c )
tji = 1929a1=6398; e
C
E = 108a1=3199
CE = 4234107(a1)
2=20467202
qii = 1363a1=3199; q
j
i = 797a1=6398
CSCE = 2332800(a1)
2=10233601; WCE = 5218560(a1)
2=10233601
A1.2 The partial FTA networks
A1.2.1. The partial-complete network (gTp ; g
RD
c )
t31 = t
3
2 = 1168331a1=8066794
t13 = t
2
3 = 1222986a1=4033397
CL = 107805289687385(a1)
2=520585323507488
CI = 122520384582963(a1)
2=520585323507488
eCL = 610183a1=16133588
eCI = 310557a1=8066794
q11 = q
2
1 = q
1
2 = q
2
2 = 10155865a1=32267176
q31 = q
3
2 = 2047795a1=16133588
q13 = q
2
3 = 5482541a1=32267176
q33(g
T
p ; g
RD
c ) = 6939739a1=16133588
CSCL = 665344416421441(a1)
2=2082341294029952
CSCI = 121778486138241(a1)
2=520585323507488
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WCL = 1147808956043549(a1)
2=2082341294029952
WCI = 71092416143781(a1)
2=130146330876872
A1.3 The star FTA networks
A1.3.1. The star-complete network (gTs ; g
RD
c )
t32 = t
2
3 = 38580a1=264481
CH = 18848195145(a1)
2=69950199361
CS = 14079601050(a1)
2=69950199361
eCH = 12099a1=264481; e
C
S = 10170a1=264481
q11 = q
1
2 = q
1
3 = 74230a1=264481
q21 = q
3
1 = q
2
2 = q
3
3 = 83875a1=264481
q32 = q
2
3 = 45295a1=264481
CSCH = 24795418050(a1)
2=69950199361
CSCS = 926289225(a1)
2=2855110178
WCH= 6234801885(a1)
2=9992885623
WCS = 77042336325(a1)
2=139900398722
A1.4 The complete FTA networks
A1.4.1. The complete empty network (gTc ; g
RD
e )
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ei = 3a1(3  2)=3
CE = 15(a1)
2(53 + 36   122)=(3)2
eCE = 3a1(3  2)=3; qii = qji = 20a1=3
CSCE= 1800(a1)
2=(3)
2
WCE= 15(a1)
2(173 + 36   122)=(3)2
where 3=71-12+12
2:
A1.4.2. The complete partial network (gTc ; g
RD
p )
LC = 15(a1)
2(11 + 15   62)2(68 + 12   32)=4(4)2
IC = 15(a1)
2(4 + 9   32)2(53 + 36   122)=(4)2
eLC = 3a1(22 + 19   272 + 63)=24
eIC = 3a1(3  2)(4 + 9   32)=4
qi1 = q
i
2 = 10a1(11 + 15   62)=4
qi3 = 20a1(4 + 9   32)=4
CSLC = CS
I
C = 1800(a1)
2(5 + 8   32)2=(4)2
WLC = 15(a1)
2K3=4(4)
2; W IC = 15(a1)
2K4=(4)
2
where 4=344+537-216
2+633-184:
K3=20228+62292+26241
2-351543+43294+9725-1086:
K4=3848+13992+9501
2-74343-10714+9725-1086:
A1.4.3. The complete star network(gTc ; g
RD
s )
HC = 1155(a1)
2(26  9 + 32)2=(5)2
SC = 6000(a1)
2(68 + 12   32)=(5)2
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eHC = 3a1(26  9 + 32)=5
eSC = 60a1(2  )=5; qi2 = qi3 = 400a1=5
qi1 = 20a1(26  9 + 32)=5
CSHC = CS
S
C = 1800(a1)
2(22  3 + 2)2=(5)2
WHC = 15(a1)
2K5=3
4(5)
2; W SC = 600(a1)
2K6(5)
2
where 5=1522-213+111
2.
K5=110132-51876+24609
2-48783+8134.
K6=2132-276+129
2-183+34.
A1.4.4. The complete complete network (gTc ; g
RD
c )
ei = 3a1=71; eCC = 3a1=71
CC = 1155(a1)
2=5041; qii = q
j
i = 20a1=71
CSCC = 1800(a1)
2=5041; WCC = 2955(a1)
2=5041
A2. Proofs10
A2.1 Proof of Lemma 1
Firstly, (gTe ; g
RD
e ) is pairwise stable for all  2 [4; 1). From (gTe ; gRDe ) rms can deviate
to (gTe ; g
RD
p ). However, 
E
E(g
T
e ; g
RD
e ) > 
L
E(g
T
e ; g
RD
p ) for all  2 (4; 1) and EE(gTe ; gRDe ) =
LE(g
T
e ; g
RD
p ) if  = 4. Hence, no rms have strict incentive to form the R&D collaborative
link between them. This establishes that (gTe ; g
RD
e ) is pairwise stable for all  2 [4; 1): It
also shows, of course, that (gTe ; g
RD
p ) is not pairwise stable for all  2 (4; 1):
10Relevant plots are available on request.
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Secondly, (gTe ; g
RD
p ) is pairwise stable for all  2 (3; 4] and  2 [0; 1). From
(gTe ; g
RD
p ), the possible deviation of rms is either (g
T
e ; g
RD
e ) or (g
T
e ; g
RD
s ). In the for-
mer case, LE(g
T
e ; g
RD
p ) > 
E
E(g
T
e ; g
RD
e ) for all  2 (3; 4) and  2 [0; 1). In the latter,
LE(g
T
e ; g
RD
p ) > 
H
E (g
T
e ; g
RD
s ) for all  2 (3; 4] and  2 [0; 1). Note that if  = 4
then the R&D collaborative link between two linked rms in the partial R&D network
will not be severed since no rms are better o¤ if they delete the R&D link because
LE(g
T
e ; g
RD
p ) = 
E
E(g
T
e ; g
RD
e ). However, if  = 3 then the R&D link between a linked rm
in the partial R&D network and the isolated rm will be formed since the isolated rm
in the partial R&D network has the strict incentive to become the spoke rm in the star
R&D network if  = 3: This conrms that (g
T
e ; g
RD
p ) is pairwise stable for all  2 (3; 4)
and  2 [0; 1). This also establishes that (gTe ; gRDe ) and (gTe ; gRDs ) are not pairwise stable
for these values of spillovers.
Thirdly, (gTe ; g
RD
s ) is the pairwise stable R&D network for all  2 [2; 3]. From
(gTe ; g
RD
s ), the possible deviation of rms is either (g
T
e ; g
RD
p ) or (g
T
e ; g
RD
c ). In the former
case, HE (g
T
e ; g
RD
s ) > 
L
E(g
T
e ; g
RD
p ) and 
S
E(g
T
e ; g
RD
s ) > 
I
E(g
T
e ; g
RD
p ) for all  2 (2; 3). In
the latter, SE(g
T
e ; g
RD
s ) > 
C
E(g
T
e ; g
RD
c ) for all  2 (2; 3). Note that if  = 2 then
the R&D collaborative link between two spoke-rms in the star R&D network will not be
formed since no rms are better o¤ if they establish the R&D link between them because
CE(g
T
e ; g
RD
c ) = 
S
E(g
T
e ; g
RD
s ). In addition, if  = 3 then the R&D link between the hub-rm
and the spoke-rm in the star R&D network will not be severed because the no rms have
strict incentive to do so. This conrms that (gTe ; g
RD
s ) is pairwise stable for all  2 [2; 3].
This also establishes that (gTe ; g
RD
p ) and (g
T
e ; g
RD
c ) is not pairwise stable for these values of
spillovers.
Fourthly, (gTe ; g
RD
c ) is pairwise stable for all  2 [0; 2]. From (gTe ; gRDc ), the possible
deviation of rms is (gTe ; g
RD
s ). However, 
C
E(g
T
e ; g
RD
c ) > 
S
E(g
T
e ; g
RD
s ) for all  2 [0; 2).
Note that if  = 2 then the R&D collaborative link between any two rms in the complete
R&D network will not be deleted since no rms are better o¤ if they cut the R&D link
between them because CE(g
T
e ; g
RD
c ) = 
S
E(g
T
e ; g
RD
s ). This conrms that (g
T
e ; g
RD
c ) is pairwise
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stable for all  2 [0; 2]. This also establishes that (gTe ; gRDs ) is not pairwise stable for these
values of spillovers. Q.E.D.
A2.2 Proof of Lemma 2
Firstly, (gTp ; g
RD
pL ) is the pairwise stable R&D network for all  2 (6; 1). From (gTp ; gRDpL )
rms can deviate either to (gTp ; g
RD
sH ) or (g
T
p ; g
RD
e ). However, 
I
I(g
T
p ; g
RD
pL ) > 
S
I (g
T
p ; g
RD
sH ) and
LL(g
T
p ; g
RD
pL ) > 
E
L (g
T
p ; g
RD
e ) for all  2 (6; 1): This establishes that (gTp ; gRDpL ) is pairwise
stable for all  2 (6; 1): It also shows, of course, that the neither (gTp ; gRDsH ) nor (gTp ; gRDe )
is pairwise stable for all  2 (6; 1).
Secondly, (gTp ; g
RD
sH ) is the pairwise stable R&D network for all  2 (5; 6]. From
(gTp ; g
RD
sH ), the possible deviation of rms is (g
T
p ; g
RD
pL ) or (g
T
p ; g
RD
pI ) or (g
T
p ; g
RD
c ). In the rst
case, HL (g
T
p ; g
RD
sH ) > 
L
L(g
T
p ; g
RD
pL ) and 
S
I (g
T
p ; g
RD
sH ) > II(gTp ; gRDpL ) for all  2 (5; 6]. In
the second, HL (g
T
p ; g
RD
sH ) > 
L
L(g
T
p ; g
RD
pI ) and 
S
L(g
T
p ; g
RD
sH ) > 
I
L(g
T
p ; g
RD
pI ) for all  2 (5; 6].
Finally, SL(g
T
p ; g
RD
sH ) > 
C
L(g
T
p ; g
RD
c ) and 
S
I (g
T
p ; g
RD
sH ) > 
C
I (g
T
p ; g
RD
c ) for all  2 (5; 6].
This conrms that (gTp ; g
RD
sH ) is pairwise stable for all  2 (5; 6]:
Thirdly, (gTp ; g
RD
c ) is the pairwise stable R&D network for all  2 [0; 5]. From
(gTp ; g
RD
pI ), the possible deviation of rms is either (g
T
p ; g
RD
sH ) or (g
T
p ; g
RD
sS ). In the rst
case, CL(g
T
p ; g
RD
c ) > 
S
L(g
T
p ; g
RD
sH ) and 
C
I (g
T
p ; g
RD
c ) > SI (gTp ; gRDsH ) for all  2 [0; 5]. In the
second case, CL(g
T
p ; g
RD
c ) > 
S
L(g
T
p ; g
RD
sS ) for all  2 [0; 5].It establishes that the Partial-
Complete network (gTp ; g
RD
c ) is the pairwise stable R&D network for all  2 [0; 5]:
Next, all other networks are not pairwise stable for all  2 [0; 1). From (gTp ; gRDe ),
rms have the incentive to deviate to (gTp ; g
RD
pL ) because 
L
L(g
T
p ; g
RD
pL ) > 
E
L (g
T
p ; g
RD
e ) for
all  2 [0; 1). (gTp ; gRDpI ) is not pairwise stable because HL (gTp ; gRDsH ) > LL(gTp ; gRDpI ) and
SL(g
T
p ; g
RD
sH ) > 
I
L(g
T
p ; g
RD
pI ) for all  2 [0; 1). It shows that rms in (gTp ; gRDpI ) have the
incentive to alter the network structure to (gTp ; g
RD
sH ). (g
T
p ; g
RD
sS ) is not a pairwise stable
R&D network because rms in the network have the incentive to deviate to (gTp ; g
RD
c ). It
is easily conrmed by inequalities: CL(g
T
p ; g
RD
c ) > 
S
L(g
T
p ; g
RD
sS ) for all  2 [0; 1). Q.E.D.
A2.3 Proof of Lemma 3
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Firstly, (gTs ; g
RD
c ) is pairwise stable for all  2 [0; 1). From (gTs ; gRDc ) rms can deviate
either to (gTs ; g
RD
sH ) or (g
T
p ; g
RD
sS ). However, 
C
S (g
T
s ; g
RD
c ) > 
S
S(g
T
s ; g
RD
sH ); 
C
H(g
T
s ; g
RD
c ) >
SH(g
T
s ; g
RD
sS ) and 
C
S (g
T
s ; g
RD
c ) > 
S
S(g
T
s ; g
RD
sS ) for all  2 [0; 1): This establishes that
(gTs ; g
RD
c ) is pairwise stable for all  2 [0; 1): It also shows, of course, that the neither
(gTs ; g
RD
sS ) nor (g
T
s ; g
RD
sH ) is pairwise stable for all  2 [0; 1):
Second, all other networks are not pairwise stable for all  2 [0; 1). From (gTs ; gRDe ),
rms can deviate either to (gTs ; g
RD
pI ) or (g
T
s ; g
RD
pL ). In the former, 
L
S(g
T
s ; g
RD
pI ) > 
E
S (g
T
s ; g
RD
e )
whereas in the latter LS(g
T
s ; g
RD
pL ) > 
E
S (g
T
s ; g
RD
e ) and 
H
S (g
T
s ; g
RD
pL ) > 
E
H(g
T
s ; g
RD
e ) for all
 2 [0; 1). It shows that rms in (gTs ; gRDe ) have the incentive to make both deviations.
(gTs ; g
RD
pI ) is not pairwise stable because rms have the incentive to alter the network
structure to (gTs ; g
RD
sS ). It is shown by the inequalities: 
S
H(g
T
s ; g
RD
sS ) > 
I
H(g
T
s ; g
RD
pI ) and
HS (g
T
s ; g
RD
sS ) > 
L
S(g
T
s ; g
RD
pI ) for all  2 [0; 1). Moreover, HH(gTs ; gRDsH ) > LH(gTs ; gRDpL ) and
SS(g
T
s ; g
RD
sH ) > 
I
S(g
T
s ; g
RD
pL ) for all  2 [0; 1). It exhibits that rms in (gTs ; gRDpL ) always have
the incentive to alter the network structure to (gTs ; g
RD
sH ) for all  2 [0; 1). Q.E.D.
A2.4 Proof of Lemma 4
First, (gTc ; g
RD
c ) is pairwise stable for all  2 [0; 1). From (gTc ; gRDc ) rms can deviate
to (gTc ; g
RD
s ). However, 
C
C(g
T
c ; g
RD
c ) > 
S
C(g
T
c ; g
RD
s ) for all  2 [0; 1): This establishes that
(gTc ; g
RD
c ) is pairwise stable for all  2 [0; 1). It also shows, of course, that (gTc ; gRDs ) is
never pairwise stable.
Second, all other network structures are not pairwise stable. (gTc ; g
RD
e ) is never pairwise
stable since LC(g
T
c ; g
RD
p ) > 
E
C(g
T
c ; g
RD
e ) for all  2 [0; 1). It conrms that (gTc ; gRDe )
should be altered to (gTc ; g
RD
p ). (g
T
c ; g
RD
p ) is never pairwise stable because 
H
C (g
T
c ; g
RD
s ) >
LC(g
T
c ; g
RD
p ) for all  2 [0; 1). It shows that rms in (gTc ; gRDp ) have the incentive to alter
the network structure to (gTc ; g
RD
s ). Q.E.D.
A2.5 Proof of Lemma 5
Empty R&D network
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First, (gTp ; g
RD
e ) is pairwise stable for all  2 [0; 7) . From (gTp ; gRDe ), governments can
deviate to (gTe ; g
RD
e ) or (g
T
s ; g
RD
e ). Because W
E
H (g
T
s ; g
RD
e ) > W
E
L (g
T
p ; g
RD
e ) for all  2 [0; 1)
but WES (g
T
s ; g
RD
e ) < W
E
I (g
T
p ; g
RD
e ) for all  2 [0; 7), it shows that the country having
no FTA in (gTp ; g
RD
e ) have no incentive to alter the network structure to (g
T
s ; g
RD
e ) for all
 2 [0; 7). Moreover, WEL (gTp ; gRDe ) > WEE (gTe ; gRDe ) so governments in (gTe ; gRDe ) always
have the incentive to deviate to (gTp ; g
RD
e ). It shows that (g
T
p ; g
RD
e ) is the pairwise stable
FTA network for all  2 [0; 7] and (gTe ; gRDe ) is never pairwise stable FTA network for all
 2 [0; 1).
Second, (gTc ; g
RD
e ) is pairwise stable FTA network for all  2 [0; 1). From (gTc ; gRDe ),
governments can deviate to (gTs ; g
RD
e ). However, W
E
C (g
T
c ; g
RD
e ) > W
E
S (g
T
s ; g
RD
e ) for all  2
[0; 1): This establishes that (gTc ; g
RD
e ) is the pairwise stable FTA network for all  2 [0; 1):
It also shows, of course, that (gTs ; g
RD
e ) is never pairwise stable for all  2 [0; 1): Q.E.D.
Partial R&D network
First, (gTp ; g
RD
pL ) is a pairwise stable FTA network for all  2 [0; 8]. From (gTp ; gRDpL ),
the possible deviation of governments is either (gTe ; g
RD
p ) or (g
T
s ; g
RD
pL ). In the former,
WLL (g
T
p ; g
RD
pL ) > W
L
E (g
T
e ; g
RD
p ) for all  2 [0; 1): In the latter, WLL (gTp ; gRDpL ) < WLH(gTs ; gRDpL )
for all  2 [0; 1) but W II (gTp ; gRDpL ) > W IS(gTs ; gRDpL ) for all  2 [0; 8). It conrms that
(gTp ; g
RD
pL ) is pairwise stable FTA network for all  2 [0; 8). It also shows that (gTe ; gRDp )
is never a pairwise stable FTA network for all  2 [0; 1).
Second, (gTc ; g
RD
p ) is a pairwise stable FTA network for all  2 [0; 1). From (gTs ; gRDp ),
governments can deviate either to (gTs ; g
RD
pL ) or (g
T
s ; g
RD
pI ). However,W
L
C (g
T
c ; g
RD
p ) > W
L
S (g
T
s ; g
RD
pL )
and W IC(g
T
c ; g
RD
p ) > W
I
S(g
T
s ; g
RD
pL ) for all  2 [0; 1): This establishes that governments in
(gTc ; g
RD
p ) have no incentives to deviate to (g
T
s ; g
RD
pL ) for all  2 [0; 1):MoreoverWLC (gTc ; gRDp ) >
WLS (g
T
s ; g
RD
pI ) for all  2 [0; 1) so governments in (gTc ; gRDp ) have no incentives to alter the
FTA network structure to (gTs ; g
RD
pI ) for all  2 [0; 1): It shows that (gTc ; gRDp ) is the pair-
wise stable FTA network for all  2 [0; 1), and neither (gTs ; gRDpI ) nor (gTs ; gRDpL ) is a pairwise
stable FTA network for all  2 [0; 1):
Third, (gTp ; g
RD
pI ) is not a pairwise stable FTA network for all  2 [0; 1). SinceW IH(gTs ; gRDpI ) >
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W IL(g
T
p ; g
RD
pI ) andW
L
S (g
T
s ; g
RD
pI ) > W
L
I (g
T
p ; g
RD
pI ) for all  2 [0; 1) so governments in (gTp ; gRDpI )
have the incentive to alter the FTA network structure to form (gTs ; g
RD
pI ) for all  2 [0; 1).
Q.E.D.
Star R&D network
First, (gTp ; g
RD
sH ) is a pairwise stable FTA network for all  2 [0; 9). From (gTp ; gRDsH ),
the possible pairwise deviation of governments is (gTe ; g
RD
s ) or (g
T
s ; g
RD
sH ) or (g
T
s ; g
RD
sS ). In
the rst, WHL (g
T
p ; g
RD
sH ) > W
H
E (g
T
e ; g
RD
s ) and W
S
L (g
T
p ; g
RD
sH ) > W
S
E (g
T
e ; g
RD
s ) for all  2
[0; 1): In the second, WHL (g
T
p ; g
RD
sH ) < W
H
H (g
T
s ; g
RD
sH ) for all  2 [0; 1) but W SI (gTp ; gRDsH ) >
W SS (g
T
s ; g
RD
sH ) for all  2 [0; 9). In the third,W SL (gTp ; gRDsH ) < WHS (gTs ; gRDsS ) butW SI (gTp ; gRDsH ) >
W SS (g
T
s ; g
RD
sS ) for all  2 [0; 9) . It conrms that (gTp ; gRDsH ) is a pairwise stable FTA net-
work for all  2 [0; 9). It also shows that (gTe ; gRDs ) is never a pairwise stable FTA network
for all  2 [0; 1).
Second, (gTc ; g
RD
s ) is a pairwise stable FTA network for all  2 [0; 1). From (gTs ; gRDs ),
governments can deviate either to (gTs ; g
RD
sH ) or (g
T
s ; g
RD
sS ). However, in the formerW
S
C (g
T
c ; g
RD
s ) >
W SS (g
T
s ; g
RD
sH ) while in the latterW
H
C (g
T
c ; g
RD
s ) > W
H
S (g
T
s ; g
RD
sS ) andW
S
C (g
T
c ; g
RD
s ) > W
S
S (g
T
s ; g
RD
sS )
for all  2 [0; 1): This establishes that governments in (gTc ; gRDs ) have no incentives to devi-
ate to any of the star FTA the network for all  2 [0; 1): It also shows that both (gTc ; gRDsH )
and (gTc ; g
RD
sS ) are not pairwise stable FTA networks for all  2 [0; 1).
Third, (gTp ; g
RD
sS ) network is not the pairwise stable FTA network for all  2 [0; 1).
Governments in (gTp ; g
RD
sS ) always have the incentive to alter the FTA network to (g
T
s ; g
RD
sS )
because WHS (g
T
s ; g
RD
sS ) > W
H
I (g
T
p ; g
RD
sS ) and W
S
H(g
T
s ; g
RD
sS ) > W
S
L (g
T
p ; g
RD
sS ) for all  2 [0; 1).
It shows that (gTp ; g
RD
sS ) is never a pairwise stable FTA network for all  2 [0; 1). Q.E.D.
Complete R&D network
First, (gTc ; g
RD
c ) is pairwise stable FTA network for all  2 [0; 1). From (gTc ; gRDc )
governments can deviate to (gTs ; g
RD
c ). However, W
C
C (g
T
c ; g
RD
c ) > W
C
S (g
T
s ; g
RD
c ) for all  2
[0; 1): This establishes that (gTc ; g
RD
c ) is the pairwise stable FTA network for all  2 [0; 1):
It also shows, of course, that (gTs ; g
RD
c ) is never pairwise stable for all  2 [0; 1):
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Second, all other network are not the pairwise stable FTA networks for all  2 [0; 1).
(gTp ; g
RD
c ) is never a pairwise stable FTA network for all  2 [0; 1) since WCH (gTs ; gRDc ) >
WCL (g
T
p ; g
RD
c ) and W
C
S (g
T
s ; g
RD
c ) > W
C
I (g
T
p ; g
RD
c ) for all  2 [0; 1). It exhibits that gov-
ernments in (gTp ; g
RD
c ) always have the strict incentive to alter the FTA network structure
to (gTs ; g
RD
c ). Moreover, W
C
L (g
T
p ; g
RD
c ) > W
C
E (g
T
e ; g
RD
c ) for all  2 [0; 1). It conrms that
(gTe ; g
RD
c ) is never a pairwise stable FTA network for all  2 [0; 1). Q.E.D.
A2.6 Proof of Proposition 3
In our model, if every country chooses its tari¤s to maximize global welfare instead of
its own national welfare, all the optimal internal tari¤s are equal to zero11. To prove this
result, we consider the empty FTA networks. It can be veried that @W (g
T
e ;g
RD)
@tji
jtji=0< 0
and @
2W (gTe ;g
RD)
@(tji )
2
jtji=0< 0. Therefore, the e¢ cient network must consist of the complete
FTA network as the rst layer of network. Figure 5 illustrates global social welfare in
di¤erent double-layer network structures, where the rst network layer is the complete
FTA network. Q.E.D.
11We are indebted to Guilherme Carmona for pointing this out.
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